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Abstract—This work considers load-balance control among
the relays under the secure transmission protocol via relay
cooperation in two-hop wireless networks without the information
of both eavesdropper channels and locations. The available
two-hop secure transmission protocols in physical layer secrecy
framework cannot provide a flexible load-balance control, which
may significantly limit their application scopes. This paper
proposes a secure transmission protocol in case that the path-
loss is identical between all pairs of nodes, in which the relay
is randomly selected from the first k preferable assistant relays.
This protocol enables load-balance among relays to be flexibly
controlled by a proper setting of the parameter k, and covers the
available works as special cases, like ones with the optimal relay
selection (k = 1) and ones with the random relay selection (k = n,
i.e. the number of system nodes). The theoretic analysis is further
provided to determine the maximum number of eavesdroppers
one network can tolerate by applying the proposed protocol to
ensure a desired performance in terms of the secrecy outage
probability and transmission outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The promising applications of wireless ad hoc networks
in many important scenarios (like battlefield networks, emer-
gency networks, disaster recovery networks) make a lot of
attention turn to ensure security and high efficiency of wireless
transmission. Two-hop wireless networks, as a building block
for large multi-hop network system, have been a class of
basic and important networking scenarios [1]. The analysis
and design of secure transmission protocol in basic two-hop
relay networks serves as the foundation for secure information
exchange of general multi-hop network system. The secure
transmission protocols based on traditional cryptographic ap-
proach can hardly achieve everlasting secrecy, because the
adversary can record the transmitted messages and try any
way to break them [2]. This motivates the signaling scheme
is considered in physical layer secrecy framework to provide
a strong form of security recently [3][4][5].
By now, a lot of research efforts have been dedicated to
secure transmission through physical layer methods. A few
secure transmission protocols with optimal relay selection via
cooperative relays have been proposed in [6][7][8], in which
the system node with best link condition to both source and
destination is selected as information relay. Although these
protocols are attractive in the sense that provides very effective
resistance against eavesdroppers, some relay nodes with good
link conditions always preferred to relay package, since the
channel state is relatively constant during a fixed time period,
which results in a severe load-balance problem and a quick
node energy depletion. In fact, the load-balance capacity is of
important property of wireless networks [9][10]. Such, these
protocol is not suitable for energy-limited wireless networks
(like wireless sensor networks). In order to address load-
balance problem, Y. Shen et al. further proposed a random
relay selection protocol [11][12], in which the relay node
is random selected from the system nodes. However, this
protocol has lower transmission efficiency, although achieving
a very good load-balance and energy consumption distribution
among system nodes. Such it is more suitable for large scale
wireless network environment with stringent energy consump-
tion constraint.
In summary, the available secure transmission protocols
cannot provide a flexible load-balance control, which may
significantly limit their application scopes. This paper focuses
on this problem and consider load-balance control capacity
for secure transmission protocol via relay cooperation in
two-hop wireless networks without the information of both
eavesdropper channels and locations. The main contributions
of this paper as follows:
• This paper extends available works and proposes a se-
cure transmission protocol via cooperative relays in two-
hop relay wireless networks without the knowledge of
eavesdropper channels and locations, where the relay is
randomly selected from the first k preferable assistant
relays. With respect to the available works, this protocol
provides flexible load-balance control by a proper setting
of k under the premise of specified secure and reliable
requirements.
• The theoretic analysis of the proposed protocol is pro-
vided to determine the corresponding exact results on
the maximum number of eavesdroppers one network can
tolerate to satisfy a specified requirements in case that the
path-loss is identical between all pairs of nodes. The anal-
ysis results also show that the proposed protocol covers
all the available secure transmission protocols as special
cases, like ones with the optimal relay selection (k = 1)
[6][7][8] and ones with the random relay selection (k = n
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Fig. 1. System scenario: Source S wishes to communicate securely with
destination D with the assistance of finite relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn (n=5 in
the figure) in the presence of passive eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em (m=5
in the figure). Cooperative relay scheme is used in the two-hop transmission.
i.e. the number of system nodes)[11][12].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents system models and proposes a secure transmission
protocol with considering load-balance control among the re-
lays. Section III presents the theoretic analysis of the proposed
protocol, and Section IV concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
A. Network Model
A two-hop wireless network scenario is considered where a
source node S wishes to communicate securely with its desti-
nation node D with the help of multiple relay nodes R1, R2,
· · · , Rn. Also present in the environment are m eavesdroppers
E1, E2, · · · , Em without knowledge of channels and locations.
The relay nodes and eavesdroppers are independent and also
uniformly distributed in the network, as illustrated in Fig.1.
Our goal here is to design a transmission protocol to ensure
the secure and reliable information transmission from source
S to destination D and provide flexible load-balance control
among the relays.
B. Transmission Model
Consider the transmission from a transmitter A to a receiver
B, and denote the ith symbol transmitted by node A by
x
(A)
i . We assume that all nodes transmit with the same power
Es and path-loss between all pairs of nodes is identical and
independent. We denote the frequency-nonselective multi-path
fading from A to B by hA,B . Under the condition that all
nodes in a group of nodes, R, are generating noises, the ith
signal received at node B from node A, denoted by y(B)i , is
determined as:
y
(B)
i = hA,B
√
Esx
(A)
i +
∑
Aj∈R
hAj ,B
√
Esx
(Aj)
i + n
(B)
i ,
The multi-path fading hA,B is assumed to follow a Rayleigh
distribution, which remains constant during the transmission
of each packet. Then, |hA,B|2 is exponentially distributed, and
without loss of generality, we assume that E
[
|hA,B|2
]
= 1.
The noise n(B)i at receiver B is assumed to be i.i.d complex
Gaussian random variables with mean N0. The SINR CA,B
from A to B is then given by
CA,B =
Es |hA,B|2∑
Aj∈REs
∣∣hAj ,B∣∣2 +N0/2
For a legitimate node and an eavesdropper, we use two sepa-
rate SINR thresholds γR and γE to define the minimum SINR
required to recover the transmitted messages for legitimate
nodes and eavesdroppers, respectively. Therefore, a system
node (the selected relay or destination) is able to decode a
packet if and only if its received SINR is greater than γR,
whereas each eavesdropper try to achieve target SINR γE to
recover the transmitted message.
C. Transmission Protocol
With respect to the protocols with optimal and random relay
selection [6][7][8][11] as special cases, a secure transmission
protocol is proposed to enable the tradeoff between the trans-
mission efficiency and load-balance capacity among the relays
to be flexibly controlled. The proposed protocol works as
follows.
1) Channel measurement: The source S and destination D
broadcast a pilot signal to allow each relay to measure
the channels from S and D to itself. The relays, which
receive the pilot signal, can accurately calculate hS,Rj
and hD,Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2) Candidate relay selection: The relays with the first k
large min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n form
the candidate relay set.
3) Relay selection: The relay, indexed by j∗, is selected
randomly from candidate relay set. Using the same
method with Step 1, each of the other relays Rj , j =
1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗ in network exactly knows hRj ,Rj∗ .
4) Two-Hop transmission: The source S transmits the
messages to Rj∗ , and concurrently, the relay nodes with
indexes in R1 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
transmit
noise to generate interference at eavesdroppers. The
relay Rj∗ then transmits the messages to destination
D, and concurrently, the relay nodes with indexes in
R2 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,D|2 < τ
}
transmit noise to gener-
ate interference at eavesdroppers.
Remark 1: The proposed protocol can flexibly control load-
balance capacity among the relays in terms of networks
requirements by a proper setting of candidate relay set size
k. The larger k, more system nodes in candidate relay set,
means the better load-balance capacity among the relays and
the lower transmission efficiency, and vice versa.
Remark 2: The parameter τ involved in the proposed
protocol serves as the threshold on path-loss, based on which
the set of noise generating relay nodes can be identified.
Notice that a too large τ may disable legitimate transmission,
while a too small τ may not be sufficient for interrupting all
eavesdroppers. Thus, the parameter τ should be set properly to
ensure both secrecy requirement and reliability requirement.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The transmission outage and secrecy outage are first defined
to depict transmission reliability and secrecy, and theoretical
analysis on the maximum numbers of eavesdroppers one
network can tolerate is presented by applying the proposed
protocol.
A. Transmission Outage and Secrecy Outage
For a Two-hop relay transmission from the source S to
destination D, we call transmission outage happens if D can
not receive the transmitted packet. We define the transmission
outage probability, denoted by P (T )out , as the probability that
transmission outage from S to D happens. For a predefined
upper bound εt on P (T )out , we call the communication between
S and D is reliable if P (T )out ≤ εt.
Regarding the secrecy outage, we call secrecy outage
happens for a transmission from S to D if at least one
eavesdropper can recover the transmitted packets during the
process of this two-hop transmission. We define the secrecy
outage probability, denoted by P (S)out , as the probability that
secrecy outage happens during the transmission from S to
D. For a predefined upper bound εs on P (S)out , we call the
communication between S and D is secure if P (S)out ≤ εs.
B. Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
We now analyze that under the proposed protocol the
number of eavesdroppers one network can tolerate to ensure
the desired performance in terms of transmission outage
probability and secrecy outage probability. The following two
lemmas regarding some basic properties of P (T )out , P
(S)
out and τ
are first presented, which will help us to derive the main result
in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes, under the proposed
protocol the transmission outage probability P (T )out and secrecy
outage probability P (S)out there satisfy the following conditions.
P
(T )
out ≤ 2

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
−

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
2
(1)
here, Ψ = e−2γR(n−1)(1−e
−τ)τ and
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)]2
(2)
Due to space limitation, the proof of this lemma is omitted,
which can be found in the reference [13].
Lemma 2: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, to ensure P (T )out ≤ εt and
P
(S)
out ≤ εs under the proposed protocol, the parameter τ must
satisfy the following condition.
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
and
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


Proof:
The parameter τ should be set properly to satisfy both
reliability and secrecy requirements.
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from formula (1) in the Lemma 1, that we just need
2

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
−

1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
2
≤ εt
Thus,
1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
[1−Ψ]iΨn−i
]
≤ 1−√1− εt (3)
Notice that
1
k
k∑
j=1
[ n∑
i=n−j+1
(
n
i
)
(1− Ψ)iΨn−i
]
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−i
]
=
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
)(n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−iΨj
]
(4)
We also notice i can take from 0 to n− j, then we have
1 ≤
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
) ≤ n!
(n− j)!j!
Substituting into formula (4), we have
1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−
n−j∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(
n−j
i
)(n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−iΨj
]
≤ 1
k
k∑
j=1
[
1−Ψj ·
n−j∑
i=0
(
n− j
i
)
(1−Ψ)iΨn−j−i
]
= 1− 1
k
k∑
j=1
Ψj
= 1− 1
k
[ k∑
j=0
1(
k
j
)(k
j
)
Ψj − 1
]
≤ 1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
Ψj − 1
]
= 1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (1 + Ψ)k − 1]
(5)
According to formula (3), (4) and (5), in order to ensure
the reliability, we need
1− 1
k
[
1(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (1 + Ψ)k − 1] ≤ 1−√1− εt
or equally,
Ψ ≥
[(
k
⌊k2 ⌋
)(
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1
that is,
e−2γR(n−1)·(1−e
−τ )τ ≥
[(
k
⌊k2 ⌋
)(
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1
Therefore
(
1− e−τ) τ ≤ − log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1)
• Secrecy Guarantee
To ensure the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs, we know
from formula (2) in Lemma 1, that we just need
2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )]2
≤ εs
Thus,
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−√1− εs
That is,
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


Based on the results of Lemma 2, we now can establish the
following theorem regarding the performance of the proposed
protocol in case of equal path-loss between all node pairs.
Theorem 1. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes. To guarantee
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs under the proposed protocol, the
number of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate must
satisfy the following condition.
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)
√√√√√−(n−1) log


[
( k⌊ k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k
−1


2γR
⌊·⌋ is the floor function.
Proof:
From Lemma 2, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√√√√√− log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γR (n− 1) (6)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log
([(
k
⌊ k2 ⌋
) (
1 + k
√
1− εt
)] 1k − 1)
2γRτ
(7)
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
(8)
From formula (7) and (8), we can get
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)− log


[
( k⌊ k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k
−1


2γRτ
(9)
By letting τ take its maximum value for maximum interfer-
ence at eavesdroppers, from formula (6) and (9), we get the
following bound
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)
√√√√√−(n−1) log


[
( k⌊ k
2
⌋)(1+k
√
1−εt)
] 1
k
−1


2γR
Based on the above analysis, by simple derivation, we can
get the follow corollary to show our proposal is a general
protocol.
Corollary 1. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes, the analysis results
of the proposed protocol is identical to that of protocols
with the optimal relay selection presented in [6][7] by setting
of k = 1, and is identical to that of protocols with the
random relay selection presented in [11][12] by setting of
k = n. More general, the proposed protocol can flexibly
control load-balance capacity among the relays in terms of
networks requirements by a proper setting of candidate relay
set size k in case that the path-loss is equal between all pairs
of nodes.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper extended the available protocol with considering
load-balance capacity and proposed a general protocol to
ensure secure and reliable information transmission through
multiple cooperative system nodes for two-hop relay wireless
networks without the knowledge of eavesdropper channels and
locations. We proved that the proposed protocol has the ability
of flexible load-balance control by a proper setting of the size
k of candidate relay set. Such, in general it is possible for us to
set proper value of parameters according to network scenario
to support various wireless applications.
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